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CASES AND CONTROVERSIES: PREGNANCY
AS PROOF OF GUILT UNDER PAKISTAN’S
HUDOOD LAWS
Moeen H. Cheema∗
ABSTRACT
Pakistan’s Hudood (Islamic criminal) laws have been a source of controversy since their promulgation by the military regime of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in 1979. For their supporters, these laws are a welcome step towards the enforcement of shari’ah (Islamic law) and, as
such, represent a logical and inevitable progression of those historic
processes that had led to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
To their opponents, these laws represent gross violations of fundamental
human rights and constitutional norms designed to uphold democratic
participation in lawmaking and the equality of citizens irrespective of
their religion or gender. However, despite the protests at home and the
notoriety generated in the international media, these laws continue to
exist on the statute books and are enforced in the courts of law.
This paper will survey the contours of the controversies surrounding
the Hudood laws, and seek to broaden the horizons of the debate surrounding these laws by incorporating an “Islamic critique” of these laws
that has generally been lacking in the discourse. More importantly, the
paper seeks to analyze the role that the Federal Shariat Court has played
in substantively shaping the law, through a chronological analysis of the
Court’s decisions on the most contentious aspects of the Hudood laws:
the conviction of rape victims for zina (consensual adultery/fornication)
regarding as proof the pregnancy caused by the rape. This analysis will
indicate the strengths of the Islamic critique and propose reforms that
may offer a viable avenue for alleviating the hardships perpetrated in the
application of the Hudood laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION

T

he military regime of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq promulgated the controversial Hudood laws1 in its early years in power,

1. The Hudood laws were enacted through four Presidential Ordinances and one
Presidential Order. See Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (VII
of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 51 (1979) [hereinafter Offence of
Zina Ordinance]; Offence of Qazf (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance, 1979 (VIII of
1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 56 (1979) [hereinafter Offence of
Qazf Ordinance]; Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979
(VI of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 44 (1979) [hereinafter Offences Against Property Ordinance]; Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, 1979 (IX of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 60 (1979) [hereinafter Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance]; Prohibition (Enforcement of
Hadd) Order, 1979 (IV of 1979), reprinted in 31 P.L.D. 1979 Central Statutes 33 (1979)
[hereinafter Prohibition Ordinance]. Article 89 of Pakistan’s Constitution empowers the
President to create laws via ordinances when the National Assembly is not in session and
“circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action.” PAK. CONST.
art. 89, cl. 1, available at http://www.nrb.gov.pk/constitutional_and_legal/constitution.
This provision enables the President to deal with any circumstances that require legisla-
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ostensibly to further the process of “Islamization” in Pakistan.2 Grafted
onto the country’s common law system, a remnant of British colonial

tive action when the Parliament is not in session, for example, in the transitory period
between elections. Such ordinances were envisaged as temporary measures that would
lapse after four months unless adopted by the Parliament. However, having taken over
power in a military coup in July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the elected Parliament and replaced it with a nominated assembly called the Majlis-e-Shoora. In the absence of Parliament, General Zia-ul-Haq used these law-making powers extensively,
especially to further the process of “Islamization” of laws in Pakistan. See Ann Elizabeth
Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015, 1042–47 (1991). In 1985, parliamentary elections were held on a non-party basis and the newly elected Parliament
passed the notorious Eighth Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution. Article 270A of the
Constitution was thereby amended to state that all ordinances, orders, and other laws
made between July 5, 1977, and the date on which the Eighth Amendment came into
force (thereby including the Hudood laws) were “affirmed, adopted and declared, notwithstanding any judgment of any court, to have been validly made by competent authority . . . .” PAK. CONST. art. 270A, cl. 2. Thereafter, the Hudood Ordinances were accorded the force equivalent to an Act of Parliament, and became entrenched in Pakistani
law.
2. Many critics have questioned General Zia’s intentions as regards his Islamization
program, or Nizam-e-Mustapha as he preferred to call it. See, e.g., ASMA JAHANGIR &
HINA JILANI, THE HUDOOD ORDINANCES: A DIVINE SANCTION? 18 (1990). They allege
that Zia, who had dismissed the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a coup d’etat,
needed a political constituency in order to sustain his military rule and cunningly used the
slogan of Islamization for this purpose. Id. Charles Kennedy contends that, despite sustained rhetoric, the Zia administration deliberately maintained a slow pace for Islamization. Charles H. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989, 63
PAC. AFF. 62 (1990) [hereinafter Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan].
In support of this argument, Kennedy provides the following evidence: (a) the Federal
Shariat Court was created with significant restrictions on its jurisdiction under Article
203B of the Constitution, including a lack of jurisdiction in matters pertaining to Muslim
personal law, fiscal laws, taxation, banking, and insurance; (b) Zia appointed a number of
“Islamic moderates” to the Shariat courts, so that many of the judges who were responsible for interpreting the Islamic reforms were not the reforms’ most zealous advocates; (c)
reform of the law of evidence (Qanoon-i-Shahadat) represented a much watered-down
version of the obscurantist manifesto since it implemented only one of the amendments—
arguably the one with least practical impact—recommended by the Council of Islamic
Ideology; and (d) two weeks after dismissing the government of Prime Minister Junejo
on the grounds that it had failed to hasten the process of Islamization, Zia nevertheless
entrusted jurisdiction of the Enforcement of Shariah Ordinance to the Pakistani High
Courts instead of the Shariat courts. Id. at 64–71. Anita Weiss suggests another agenda
behind Islamization: that one primary objective of Islamization, rather than a mere side
effect, was the systematic reduction in the power and participation of women in the public sphere. See Anita M. Weiss, Women’s Position in Pakistan: Sociocultural Effects of
Islamization, 25 ASIAN SURV. 863, 876–77 (1985) (“Traditional Islamic law as applied in
the South Asian context has favored the maintenance of extended patrilineal kinship networks and the control of women.”).
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rule, the laws sought to criminalize extra-marital sexual relations3 and the
consumption of alcohol,4 as well as to bring into conformity with Islamic
injunctions rules relating to certain offenses against property.5 The laws
also introduced punishments of rajm (stoning to death)6 and public
whipping into the criminal laws of Pakistan.7 Concurrent with the promulgation of the Hudood laws, General Zia’s regime introduced a parallel
judicial system consisting of the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) and the
Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court8 empowered to review
and declare invalid any law found to be inconsistent with shari’ah (Islamic law) injunctions.9
3. See Offence of Zina Ordinance § 4, supra note 1, at 52.
4. See Prohibition Ordinance §§ 3–16, supra note 1, at 34–37.
5. See Offences Against Property Ordinance pmbl., supra note 1, at 44.
6. See Offence of Zina Ordinance §§ 5–6, 17, supra note 1, at 52, 55.
7. See Execution of the Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, supra note 1, at 60–62.
In fact, while rajm was indeed a novel introduction to Pakistan’s penal system, it may not
be accurate to describe whipping as either a new or an exclusively “Islamic” form of
punishment. Whipping was an available punishment prior to the Hudood laws under the
Whipping Act, 1909. See Whipping Act, 1909 (IV of 1909), available at
http://www.pakistanlawyers.org (follow “Statutes and Rules” hyperlink). For example, in
Farzand Ali v. State, 1971 S.C.M.R. 715 (Sup. Ct. 1971), a case predating the Hudood
Ordinances, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence for rape and kidnapping offenses,
which included a penalty of twenty lashes. This case is rare, however, and except for
whippings carried out in jails for disciplinary reasons, whipping was rarely employed as a
punishment under the general criminal laws prior to the Hudood laws’ enactment.
8. Initially, the shariat courts constituted part of the Pakistani High Courts. These
courts were given judicial independence on May 26, 1980, after the insertion of Article
203C to Pakistan’s Constitution. See PAK. CONST. art. 203C. The FSC consists of eight
Muslim judges, three of whom are ulema (religious scholars). Id. cls. 2, 3A. The remaining judges are appointed from amongst those who are qualified to be judges of the High
Courts. Id. cl. 3A. The Chief Justice must be serving on the High Courts, or should be
qualified to be a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Id. cl. 3. Any judge of the High
Courts who refuses appointment to the FSC faces automatic retirement. Id. cl. 5. The FSC
has the power to review any and all Pakistani laws to determine whether they are repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. Id. art. 203D, cl. 1. FSC decisions are supreme, binding
the High Courts and all lower courts. Id. art. 203GG. As regards the Hudood laws, the
FSC acts as a court of appeals. Id. art. 203DD. Appeals from judgments of the FSC lie
before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. Id. art. 203F, cl. 1. The Shariat
Appellate Bench consists of three Muslim judges of the Supreme Court as well as two ad
hoc ulema judges appointed by the President. Id. cl. 3. These two appointed ulema judges
are picked either from the FSC, or from a panel of ulema nominated by the President in
consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Id. cl. 3(b).
9. Commenting on the significance of this event, Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, retired
Chief Justice of Pakistan, stated:
The conferment of such a power of judicial review, with a view to Islamising
the existing laws, has no parallel in judicial history. No such power was con-
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The promulgation of the Hudood laws received robust support from a
small segment of Pakistani society: religious political parties and their
most ardent followers.10 For these supporters, the laws were a welcome
step towards the enforcement of shari’ah, and, as such, represented a
logical and inevitable progression of those historic processes that had led
to the creation of the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”11 The Hudood laws
ferred on Courts during the Muslim Rule when Islamic Fiqh was the governing
law . . . . This indeed was a most awesome and far-reaching power, without any
parallel in the history of the Islamic world and also a very potent instrument for
accomplishing the process of Islamisation of laws within the shortest possible
period. This power was, in fact, availed of fully both by the Federal Shariat
Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court for bringing about
the Islamisation of existing laws. Indeed as a result of the decisions of these
Courts and the consequential steps taken to implement them, a silent revolution
has come about in the legal field.
Nasim Hasan Shah, Islamisation of Law in Pakistan, 47 P.L.D. 1995 Journal 37, 41–42
(1995).
10. Religious political parties have historically failed to garner significant support in
general elections. See Hassan Abbas, Pakistan Through the Lens of the “Triple A” Theory, 30 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 181, 186 (2006). However, such parties have, at various times, enjoyed considerable power by virtue of their presence in governing coalitions.
For example, the “MMA” (Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal), a coalition of six religious political
parties, achieved unprecedented success in the latest general elections held in October
2002, and currently commands a majority in the provincial legislature of the North West
Frontier Province. B. Muralidhar Reddy, Pakistan’s Religious Parties Losing Ground?,
THE HINDU, Sept. 2, 2005, at 2.
11. The demands for Islamization of laws are as old as Pakistan itself. According to
Maulana Abul A’la Maudoodi, a renowned religious scholar, political activist, and the
founder of the Jamaat’i Islami religious-political party: “The Pakistan movement was an
expression of Muslim India’s firm desire to establish an Islamic State. The movement
was inspired by the ideology of Islam and the country was carved into existence solely to
demonstrate the efficacy of the Islamic way of life.” MAULANA ABUL A’LA MAUDOODI,
THE ISLAMIC LAW AND CONSTITUTION 10 (Khurshid Ahmad trans., Islamic Publications
4th ed. 1969) (1955). Dr. Nasim Hassan Shah has expressed similar sentiments: “The
main reason why the Muslims of undivided India demanded Pakistan was that they
wished to have a State where they could live according to their own cultural values, traditions and Laws.” Shah, supra note 9, at 37. However, despite expressing an aspiration of
Islamization in the Objectives Resolution, 1949, the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, as well as later framers of the three Constituents of Pakistan, failed to give more
than a lip service to the agenda of Islamization of laws. See Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of
Religion & Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 40, 63 (1995). All three Constitutions, adopted in 1956, 1962, and 1973, included “Islamic provisions” which sought the Islamization of laws through legislation
upon the advice of advisory councils composed of religious scholars. However, the process of Islamization did not take hold until the emergence of General Zia on the political
scene, who gave the power of Islamization to the shariat courts. See William L. Richter,
The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan, 19 ASIAN SURV. 547 (1979),
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immediately generated vehement protests and criticism from an equally
partial sector of the society:12 urban, “liberal,” and “Westernized” members of human rights and women’s rights organizations who subscribed
to the notion of “separation of church and state.”13 To these opponents,
the laws represented gross violations of fundamental human rights, constitutional norms designed to uphold democratic participation in lawmaking, and the equality of citizens irrespective of their religion or gender.14
However, despite the protests, the majority of Pakistani citizens, ignorant
for a multi-faceted explanation of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan during the Zia regime in
addition to Zia’s personal interest in raising the banner of Islamization. Richter attributes
the revival to a number of socio-political factors: the search for a national identity after
the Bangladesh debacle; increased ties and enhanced proximity with the Middle East;
increase in the geo-political rise of the Middle East on account of oil wealth; broader
Islamic revival in the region; and disillusionment with the failures of capitalism and socialism in Pakistan. Id. at 549–57.
12. For a pictorial presentation of the protests held in opposition to the Hudood laws
and their violent suppression by the military regime, see JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note
2, at 34–45.
13. See id. at 18, 21. According to these authors, one can group people into four categories based on their opinions of Hudood laws. First, there are the unrelenting obscurantists who fully support the laws. See id. at 18. Second, there are those amongst the fundamentalists who realize that these laws are defective but “do not ask for their repeal or
amendment because they think it would generally undermine the process of Islamization
of laws.” Id. at 21. Third, there are the patchworkers: “Theirs is the mission of peace
making. They do not advocate any radical positions. They neither support the law in full
nor seek its repeal. They want to appease both factions through amendments here and
there.” Id. Fourth, and last, there are the secularist opponents who “reject religion as a
basis or source of law.” Id.
14. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, supra note 2, at 74. Kennedy catalogues the criticisms leveled against the Hudood laws and Pakistan’s Islamization program as follows:
(a) The human rights argument. The punishments specified in the hudood ordinances (stoning to death, amputation, whipping) constitute cruel and unusual
punishments, and border on barbarism. (b) The reactionary argument. Nizam-iMustapha is characterized as an attempt to set Pakistan back fourteen hundred
years to the time of Rightly-Guided Caliphs. (c) The undemocratic argument.
Zia’s Islamization program was designed to lend support to an unpopular military regime. His policies had the effect of banning political parties and silencing political opposition. (d) The anti-minority argument. The Nizam-iMustapha discriminates against non-Muslims, particularly the Ahmadiyya, and
Christians. A corollary of this argument is that Nizam-i-Mustapha is dominated
by the Sunni Hanafi fiqh, that is, it is anti-Shia. (e) The misogyny argument. Nizam-i-Mustapha discriminates against the rights of women. And (f) the antirational argument. Nizam-i-Mustapha is opposed to modernity and Westernization; and it is obscurantist.
Id.
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of the laws’ questionable Islamic credentials, weak doctrinal foundations,
and numerous procedural defects, were swayed by the misleading label
and remained approvingly silent.15
Although the Hudood laws have been mired in controversy since their
inception, limited meaningful public deliberation has occurred during the
last two decades. The argumentation over the Hudood laws, as well as
the process of Islamization, has been mostly journalistic and occasionally
academic.16 This has served only to harden the two extreme positions,
with the two sides talking at each other, rarely listening, and hardly
changing any minds.
Every democratically elected government constituted after the demise
of General Zia, representing both sides of the political divide, has refrained from tinkering with the Hudood laws.17 This suggests an appreciation on the part of the country’s lawmakers that the ideology of Islamization, if not the Hudood laws themselves, has continued to command
the allegiance of a substantial majority of the citizens.18 Significantly, the

15. JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 22.
16. Whereas Pakistan’s print media has historically betrayed a sensationalist bent,
Western news media have exhibited a distinct bias against Islamic reforms. See Naz K.
Modirzadeh, Taking Islamic Law Seriously: INGOs and the Battle for Muslim Hearts and
Minds, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191, 191–94 (2006). The portrayals of Hudood laws in
both domestic and international media have also been particularly affected by the complexity of these laws, resulting in perpetual repetition of inaccurate assertions. Unfortunately, many of these inaccuracies have even filtered into academic discourse. See infra
note 113 and accompanying text.
17. For example, Benazir Bhutto’s fierce opposition to Zia’s Islamization program
formed the centerpiece of the Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP) election campaign in 1988.
However, upon forming her government, Bhutto let the issues over Islamization fade
from the public debate. As a result, the Hudood laws remained intact during the PPP
governments of 1988-1990 and 1993-1996. See Saeed Shafqat, Pakistan Under Benazir
Bhutto, 36 ASIAN SURV. 655, 657–58 (1996).
18. The “undemocratic” critiques of General Zia’s Islamization program implicitly
concede this point. See JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 22. However, Richard Kurin
questions the assumption of widespread support for the Islamization process amongst
Pakistan’s mostly rural population. Richard Kurin, Islamization in Pakistan: A View from
the Countryside, 25 ASIAN SURV. 852 (1985). His personal observations from a village in
Central Punjab, recorded during 1978 and 1983, indicated only a limited influence of
state-sponsored Islamization upon the daily lives of the villagers. Id. at 861. Kurin remarks that the villagers continued to exclude religious teachers from public decisionmaking, play cards, listen to loud music, refrain from praying and fasting, and condone
adulterous affairs long after the enforcement of shari’ah laws in Pakistan. Id. at 854–61.
However, it hardly needs saying that one village in Central Punjab is not a representative
sample. But cf. JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 18 (arguing that Islamization has
taken hold in Pakistan “despite the lack of overall popular support” because “the Islamic
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Hudood laws have come to symbolize to many Western observers the
perceived retrogressive and discriminatory nature of Islam and Islamic
laws. In the present geo-political environment characterized by the
“Clash of Civilizations” and the “War on Terror,” the Hudood laws appear to highlight the dangers associated with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.19
A major reason for the failure of anti-Hudood activists to win widespread public support has been an inability, or perhaps a conscious decision on their part, to effectively and credibly challenge the fidelity of
these laws to their Islamic doctrinal foundations.20 Further, a bulk of the
critique has focused on the language and the structure of the Hudood Ordinances and their misapplication in the trial courts.21 Inadequate attention has been paid thus far to the evolving jurisprudence of the Shariat
appellate courts, which, compelled by the logic of traditional fiqh (Ispolitical parties carry a group of dedicated followers, with enough strength, organisation
and clout to keep all governments from implementing a progressive secular policy”).
19. See, e.g., CHERYL BENARD, CIVIL DEMOCRATIC ISLAM: PARTNERS, RESOURCES,
AND STRATEGIES 17–20 (2003) (discussing the harsh criminal punishments in fundamentalist Islamic justice); Joan Fitzpatrick & Alice Miller, International Standards on the
Death Penalty: Shifting Discourse, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 273, 358–60 (1993) (contending that the prevalence of capital punishment in Pakistan is owed to the influence of Islamic fundamentalism).
20. In 2002, the National Commission on the Status of Women (“NCSW”) formed a
fifteen-member Special Committee to review the Hudood Ordinances. The Committee
held five meetings and recommended, by a sizable majority, that the Ordinances be repealed. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT ON HUDOOD ORDINANCES
1979 13–14 (2003) [hereinafter NCSW Report]. The NCSW Report, while refreshing the
controversy, has added very little to the academic debate. It merely summarizes the diverse opinions expressed at the meetings, which, for the most part, are regurgitations of
standard arguments. The superficiality of the analysis conducted in the NCSW Report is
reflected most clearly in its discussions on the question of rajm, which the Report acknowledged required detailed study, yet with little hesitation recommended its repeal. See
id. at 13–14, 36–38. Thus far, no action has been taken in pursuance of the NCSW Report. Like earlier efforts from the Commission of Inquiry for Women, the NCSW Report
is likely to be ignored. See THE COMM’N OF INQUIRY FOR WOMEN, REPORT OF THE
COMM’N OF INQUIRY FOR WOMEN (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter CIW Report]. In 1997, that
commission had also recommended repeal of the Hudood laws after finding, without a
thorough investigation, the laws to be “not in conformity with injunctions of Islam.” Id.
at 75. However, this report had done a much better job than the NCSW Report as far as
documenting the problems associated with the enforcement of the Hudood laws.
21. See JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 85–130, for a work representative of this
approach. Jahangir and Jilani’s book contains extensive analysis of trial cases in which
the Sessions courts have made glaring errors. Problem decisions handed down by the
FSC have also been highlighted. However, the book makes only passing references to
those FSC cases overturning Sessions courts’ decisions or overruling problematic FSC
decisions, and it offers no analysis whatsoever of the FSC’s jurisprudence.
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lamic jurisprudence) doctrines, have managed to shape the substantive
laws in a manner that appears to alleviate many of the criticisms directed
against these laws.22 This lack of attention towards the role of the Shariat
courts in shaping the Hudood laws may be attributable to a general perception amongst the critics that the Shariat courts espouse an essentially
conservative ideology in consonance with the proponents of the Hudood
laws. This perception, which is rooted in the political origins and the
early history of the Shariat courts,23 does not fully accord with the recent
practice or the present jurisprudential approach of the Shariat courts in
Pakistan.24
22. Amira Sonbol contends that inattention to the practice of shari’ah courts in general is pervasive in Western scholarship of Islamic law. Amira Sonbol, Women in
Shari’ah Courts: A Historical and Methodological Discussion, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
225 (2003). Studying the practice of pre-modern shari’ah courts in Egypt, Sonbol discovers that the legal precedents of these courts protected the rights of women to a greater
extent than many of the religious and secular codes in force today. Id. at 252. She concludes that “ideological presumptions,” along with a lack of research, has led to the almost total disregard for the “legal practices accumulated over the centuries which had
constituted a common law” in Islamic societies. Id.
23. The establishment of the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of
the Supreme Court generated substantial criticism on various constitutional grounds. See
generally Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, supra note 2, at 66–67.
First, in establishing these “Islamic” courts, the President amended Pakistan’s Constitution in the absence of Parliament. Second, the President’s power of appointment of ulema
judges to the judiciary gave rise to the concern that the Shariat courts would adopt the
orthodox positions on interpretations of Islamic law espoused by a segment of the society
that formed a numerically insignificant portion of the electorate. Having the power to
overrule any legislation enacted by future democratically elected Parliaments, the Shariat
courts, it was feared, would impose the views of this minority over those of the majority.
Third, the creation of the Shariat courts appeared to undermine further the idea that the
judiciary was an independent branch of Pakistani government.
24. See Julie Dror Chadbourne, Never Wear Your Shoes After Midnight: Legal Trends
Under the Pakistan Zina Ordinance, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 179, 181 (1999) (“[W]hile the
body of law relating to the Zina Ordinance is varied, the Pakistani judiciary is developing
case law that may assist future advocates . . . in their efforts on behalf of their clients.”).
In fact, it has been argued that the FSC has always played less of a demonic role than has
been attributed to it by its critics. See Charles H. Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan:
Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, 28 ASIAN SURV. 307 (1988) [hereinafter
Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan]. In a statistical review of the jurisprudence of the
FSC from 1980 to 1984, Charles Kennedy found that the FSC “accepts or partially accepts an extraordinarily high percentage of the appeals before it . . . [and] that the FSC
‘upheld fully’ only 19% of the convictions brought before it and that it acquitted 52% of
the appellates.” Id. at 309. Kennedy also found that over ninety percent of the cases overturned by the FSC were reversed “because of misappreciation of facts, not misinterpretation of law, . . . [and that] even in cases in which it upheld the conviction of the sessions
judge, the FSC was more lenient in its sentencing.” Id. at 309–10. Accordingly, Kennedy
concluded that the “the net effect of FSC decisions . . . has been to moderate substantially
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This paper will survey the contours of the controversies surrounding
the Hudood laws and seek to identify the extent to which the divergent
perceptions accord with the reality. The aim is to broaden the horizons of
the debate surrounding the Hudood laws by incorporating an “Islamic
critique,” something that has generally been lacking in the discourse.
More importantly, the paper seeks to analyze the role that the FSC has
played in substantively shaping the law, indicating thereby that Islamic
critiques may offer a viable avenue for alleviating the hardships perpetrated in the application of the Hudood laws. Whereas, it may not be
practical to undertake a holistic analysis of the FSC’s entire jurisprudence at this stage, this paper will put forward a chronological analysis
of the Court’s decisions on one―arguably the most contentious―aspect
of the Hudood laws: the conviction of rape victims for zina (consensual
adultery/fornication) where the pregnancy caused by the rape is regarded
as proof of the crime. Criticisms of this scenario have been repeated persistently in both international and domestic news media, and have even
become cliché in most academic critiques of the Hudood laws.25 Most
such critiques, however, offer little or no analysis of the relevant jurisprudence of the Shariat courts.
Part II of the paper will provide an overview of the provisions of the
“Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979” (Zina Ordinance), and outline the circumstances in which some trial courts have
considered pregnancy as proof of zina in cases prosecuted under the Ordinance. Part III of the paper shall present a review of the jurisprudence
of the FSC, indicating the extent to which the Court has addressed the
criticisms engendered by the consideration of pregnancy as proof of
zina.26 Part IV will then highlight the principal arguments presented by
both the proponents and opponents of the Hudood laws, and analyze the
major disagreements in their approaches. Furthermore, it will be argued
that this debate has reached a stalemate primarily because it fails to incorporate a vital dimension: a thorough and credible Islamic critique,
the zeal of the sessions judges in enforcing the Hudood statutes.” Id. at 310. Kennedy
attributes this moderation to the typical composition of the Shariat courts and the background of the judges. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, supra note 2,
at 65–66. Whereas the critics complain about the presence of ulema judges on the bench,
Kennedy points out that eighteen of the twenty-three judges appointed to serve on the
FSC between 1980 and 1989 were former High Court judges, and that twenty possessed
Western-style law degrees. Id. at 66.
25. See, e.g., JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 86–87; Weiss, supra note 2, at 870.
26. This part of the paper will incorporate detailed excerpts from the relevant judgments, many of which have been written in grammatically or stylistically deficient English. No attempt has been made to revise the language since it is important to let the
judges, under scrutiny, speak for themselves.
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evaluating the extent to which the Hudood laws, as presently enforced in
Pakistan, accord with the traditional fiqh doctrines upon which they are
supposedly founded. The paper shall also advance the argument that the
positive developments in the jurisprudence of the FSC are not merely
attributable to the political pressures generated by the opponents of the
Hudood laws or to international media attention. Rather, it will be shown
that the categorical imperatives embedded in the Islamic fiqh doctrines at
the foundations of the Hudood laws necessitate many of the positions
taken by the Court. Proposals for reform and a conclusion will follow.
II. THE ZINA ORDINANCE
A. Overview
It is said that the Zina Ordinance introduced the sexual offenses of zina
and zina-bil-jabr (rape) into Pakistan’s criminal laws.27 Whereas zina
was a previously unknown offense,28 the zina-bil-jabr provisions of the
Ordinance replaced pre-existing rape provisions in the Pakistan Penal
Code.29 However, the FSC has held that the Ordinance represents a

27. See Offence of Zina Ordinance §§ 4, 6, supra note 1, at 52. Additionally, the Zina
Ordinance transferred some offenses from the general criminal laws of the Pakistan Penal
Code to the Hudood laws, or created new offenses similar to those already existing. See,
e.g., id. § 12, at 54 (prohibiting “[k]idnapping or abducting in order to subject person to
unnatural lust”); id. § 14, at 54 (prohibiting “[b]uying person for purposes of prostitution”); id. § 15, at 55 (prohibiting “[c]ohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a
belief of marriage”); id. § 16, at 55 (prohibiting “[e]nticing or taking away or detaining
with criminal intent a woman”).
28. While zina was a previously unknown offense, adultery was already punishable
under the Pakistan Penal Code. The penal code provided:
Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or
has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of
rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with
fine, or with both. In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.
PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 20, § 497 (1860) (repealed by Zina Ordinance). Adultery, prior to the
Zina Ordinance, was thus an offense that could only be committed by a man. Fornication,
or consensual sexual intercourse between unmarried persons, was not an offense prior to
the enforcement of the Zina Ordinance.
29. See PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16-A, §§ 375–376 (1860), repealed by Offence of Zina
Ordinance § 3, supra note 1, at 52.
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“complete departure” from the previous law.30 Accordingly, “no offence
by the name of rape exists in the corpus juris of Pakistan” any longer.31
Section 4 of the Ordinance defines the offense of zina as willful sexual
intercourse between a man and a woman who are not validly married to
each other.32 Zina is liable to the punishment of hadd (punishment ordained by the Qur’an)33 if the following proof is presented to the Sessions Court (the trial court): the accused confesses to the commission of
zina before the court, or the prosecution presents four credible adult male
Muslim eyewitnesses who have seen the very act of penetration.34 The
30. Muhammad Asghar v. State, 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. 1, 5 (1984).
31. Muhammad Hayat v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Faisalabad, 2002 Y.L.R. 23, 24
(Lahore High Ct. 2001).
32. Section 4 of the Zina Ordinance provides:
4. Zina.–A man and a woman are said to commit ‘zina’ if they willfully have
sexual intercourse without being validly married to each other.
Explanation.–Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of zina.
Offence of Zina Ordinance § 4, supra note 1, at 52.
33. Hudood are generally defined as those crimes for which punishment has been
fixed by divine commandment. Though this definition is uniformly adhered to by the
ulema, the catalogue of the Hudood crimes in fact varies. As such, some consider only
those crimes to be Hudood which have been mentioned in the Qur’an and for which the
punishment has been explicitly prescribed therein. Others include those crimes that,
though mentioned in the Qur’an, punishment is not explicitly provided. For example, the
consumption of alcohol is forbidden by the Qur’an, but it provides no punishment. Yet, a
majority of the ulema consider this to be a hadd offense and derive its punishment from
the Sunnah. A third category of ulema point out that there is no distinction between hadd
and tazir in the Sunnah, and consider all those crimes which are referenced in the Qur’an
or the Sunnah to be hadd crimes. There are only four crimes that have been explicitly
mentioned in the Qur’an: zina, haraabah (variously defined as highway robbery, forcible
taking of property, or waging war against the state); shurb al-khamr (consumption of
wine); and qazf (unwarranted accusation of zina). Of these, the punishment for shurb alkhamr is not mentioned in the Qur’an. Verse 5:33 of the Qur’an, which deals with haraabah, mentions four possible punishments for this category of crimes: taqteel (execution),
tasleeb (crucifixion), amputation of a hand and the opposite foot, or exile. As regards
zina, although the Qur’an expressly mentions the punishment of one hundred lashes in
verse 24:02, a majority of the ulema have relied on certain ahadith (narrations on what
the Prophet Muhammad approved) to establish rajm as the appropriate hadd punishment.
See Hazoor Bakhsh v. Federation of Pakistan, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. 145, 153 (1981)
(Durrani, J., dissenting) (“No doubt the punishment for a married woman . . . is stoning to
death as against [an] unmarried one who is to be given 100 lashes.”).
34. Section 8 of the Zina Ordinance, which establishes the proof requirements, provides:
8. Proof of zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd.–Proof of Zina or zina-bil-jabr,
liable to hadd shall be in one of the following forms, namely:–
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hadd punishment for zina committed by a man or woman who is, or has
previously been, married and has had sexual intercourse in the course of
that marriage is rajm.35 The hadd punishment for zina committed by a
(a) the accused makes before a Court of competent jurisdiction a confession of
the commission of the offence; or
(b) at least four Muslim adult male witnesses, about whom the Court is satisfied, having regard to the requirements of tazkiyah al-shuhood, that they are
truthful persons and abstain from major sins (kabair), give evidence as eyewitnesses of the act of penetration necessary to the offence. Provided that, if the
accused is a non-Muslim, the eye-witnesses may be non-Muslims.
Explanation. In this section “tazkiyah al-shuhood” means the mode of inquiry
adopted by a Court to satisfy itself as to the credibility of a witness.
Offence of Zina Ordinance § 8, supra note 1, at 53. The FSC has consistently interpreted
the confession requirement of subsection (a) to mean confessions freely given before the
Sessions Court on four different occasions. Confessions made to the police or to a Magistrate in pre-trial proceedings do not fulfill this requirement. See, e.g., Zafran Bibi v. State,
54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. 1, 14 (2002). The requirement of four Muslim adult male witnesses has been derived from the following Qur’anic injunction:
If any of your women Are guilty of lewdness, Take the evidence of four (reliable)
witnesses from amongst you Against them; and if they testify, Confine them to
houses until Death do claim them, Or God ordain for them Some (other) way.
Qur’an 4:15 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., The Islamic Center 3d ed. 1938).
35. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 5(2)(a), supra note 1, at 52. The distinction between
adultery and fornication has proven to be one of the most debated aspects of the Zina
Ordinance. The Qur’anic injunction in verse 4:15 has been widely understood to antedate
verse 24:2, the only prescription in the Qur’an of a specific punishment for adultery and
fornication:
The woman and the man Guilty of adultery or fornication, Flog each of them With a
hundred stripes: Let not compassion move you In their case, in a matter Prescribed
by God, if ye believe In God and the Last Day: And let a party Of the Believers
Witness their punishment.
Qur’an 4:15 (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans., The Islamic Center 3d ed. 1938). Verse 24:2
betrays no distinction between adultery and fornication and prescribes only one punishment for both offenses, one-hundred lashes in public. A majority of the Justices sitting on
the FSC panel in Hazoor Bakhsh seized upon this verse to declare rajm un-Islamic. See
Hazoor Bakhsh, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. at 147 (Ali Hyder, J., concurring) (“[S]toning to
death . . . is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam.”). This decision resulted in significant
embarrassment to the military regime of General Zia, which immediately amended the
Constitution to grant the FSC the power to review its own judgments. JAHANGIR &
JILANI, supra note 2, at 29. In 1982, the review petition was heard by a wholly reconstituted FSC: the three judges who had formed the Hazoor Bakhsh majority had since been
removed, and the one dissenting judge, who had opined that rajm is a valid Islamic hadd
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man or woman who is neither married, nor previously been married, is
public whipping of one-hundred lashes.36 A sentence of hadd may only
be executed if the FSC has confirmed it after a hearing, regardless of
whether or not the defendant has filed an appeal.37
Section 6 of the Ordinance defines zina-bil-jabr as the act of having
non-consensual sexual intercourse with a man or woman with whom the
accused is not validly married.38 Zina-bil-jabr is committed when the
accused has had intercourse either: (a) against the victim’s will; (b) without the victim’s consent; (c) after obtaining the victim’s consent by duress; or (d) after obtaining the victim’s consent by inducing a fraudulent
belief of a valid marriage.39 Zina-bil-jabr is liable to hadd punishment if
proof according to Section 8 of the Ordinance is presented before the
Court.40 The hadd punishment for zina-bil-jabr committed by a man who
is, or has previously been, married and has had sexual intercourse in the
course of that marriage is rajm.41 The hadd punishment for zina-bil-jabr
committed by a man who is not, and has never previously been, married
is public whipping of one-hundred lashes, as well as any other punishment, including a death sentence, that the court may consider appropriate

punishment, had died by the time the review petition was heard. This reconstituted FSC
unanimously held that rajm was not repugnant to Islam. Id. at 29–30.
36. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 5(2)(b), supra note 1, at 52.
37. Id. § 5(3).
38. Id. § 6. Section 6(1) of the Zina Ordinance makes it clear that a woman can be
accused of committing zina-bil-jabr against a man, or possibly even a woman. Contrast
this with the repealed rape provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, which defined rape as
the commission of sexual intercourse “with a woman . . . [a]gainst her will . . . [or
w]ithout her consent.” PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16-A, § 375 (1860) (repealed by Zina Ordinance). Other than the gender-neutrality of its language, section 6 of the Zina Ordinance
mimics the repealed rape provisions. This gender-neutrality is somewhat perplexing since
penetration is a requirement for criminal liability. See Offence of Zina Ordinance §4,
supra note 1, at 52 (“Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of ‘zina-bil-Jabr’.”). It is, therefore, hard to conceive of a situation in
which a woman may commit zina-bil-jabr with a man or another woman. Additionally,
note that the section 6 definition of zina-bil-jabr excludes marital rape from its prohibition. See id. §6(1) (providing that the zina-bil-jabr prohibition applies only to those persons “not validly married”). This is a point of divergence between the Zina Ordinance
and the repealed Pakistan Penal Code provisions, which provided for a punishment of up
to two years imprisonment. PAK. PEN. CODE ch. 16-A, § 376 (1860) (repealed by Zina
Ordinance).
39. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 6(1), supra note 1, at 52.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 6(3)(a), supra note 1, at 53.
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having regard to the circumstances of the case.42 As with sentences of
hadd for convictions of zina, sentences of hadd for convictions of zinabil-jabr cannot be executed unless they are confirmed by the FSC.43
If the proof required for hadd punishment is not available, a court may
still convict the accused of either zina or zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir (discretionary punishment under the Zina Ordinance) where other direct or
circumstantial evidence of the commission of the offense is available.44
The maximum tazir punishment for zina is rigorous imprisonment of ten
years.45 The tazir punishment for zina-bil-jabr is rigorous imprisonment
of four to twenty-five years.46 In cases of zina-bil-jabr committed by a

42. Id. § 6(3)(b). Note that this is the same punishment that the Qu’ran prescribes for
zina in verse 24:2. See supra note 35. The Qu’ran does not explicitly take cognizance of,
or prescribe punishment for, rape.
43. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 6(4), supra note 1, at 53.
44. As opposed to hadd punishments, tazir punishments are not statutorily fixed and
may be left to the discretion of the judge. Compare id. § 5(2), at 52 (detailing punishment
for zina liable to hadd), and id. § 6(3), at 53 (detailing punishment for zina-bil-jabr liable
to hadd), with id. §§ 10(2), 10(3), at 54 (detailing punishments for zina and zina-bil-jabr
liable to tazir).
45. Id. § 10(2), at 54. Asifa Quraishi has questioned the very logic of awarding tazir
punishments for zina. Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws
of Pakistan from a Woman Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287, 313 (1997).
She points out that punishment for zina as hadd requires the eyewitness testimony of four
individuals, because the crime is prosecutable by the state only when it is a public act of
indecency. Id. at 311–13. At the same time, the Qu’ran strictly forbids qazf, or unsubstantiated accusations of zina. When an allegation of zina is made and four eyewitnesses are
not forthcoming, the Qu’ran declares:
And those who launch A charge against chaste women, And produce not four
witnesses (to support their allegations), ― Flog them with eighty stripes; And
reject their evidence Ever after: for such men Are wicked transgressors; ―
Unless they repent thereafter And mend (their conduct); For God is OftForgiving, Most Merciful.
Qu’ran 24:4. Therefore, Quraishi argues, the Qu’ran forbids prosecution for zina as tazir,
since such charges are invariably brought only when four eyewitnesses are not available.
Quraishi, supra, at 312. In such circumstances, she continues, the only offense that
should be prosecuted is the qazf committed by the complainant. See id. at 299.
46. Offence of Zina Ordinance § 10(3), supra note 1, at 54. Sections 10(2) and 10(3)
of the Zina Ordinance had prescribed a sentence of whipping of up to thirty lashes in
addition to imprisonment for tazir offenses. However, the Abolition of the Punishment of
Whipping Act, 1996 (VII of 1996) eliminated whipping as a punishment for all offenses,
including tazir, other than those “where the punishment of whipping is provided for as
hadd.” See, e.g., Abdul Razzaque v. State, 2003 P.Cr.L.J. 1256 (Lahore High Ct. 2002)
(setting aside the whipping portion of the petitioner’s sentence for zina-bil-jabr liable to
tazir).
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gang of two or more people, the tazir punishment is a mandatory death
sentence.47
B. Pregnancy as Proof of Guilt
One of the primary criticisms leveled against the Zina Ordinance is that
it results in the equation of rape with consensual adultery/fornication
such that when a victim of rape is unable to prove that she had been subjected to non-consensual intercourse, she herself stands accused of having committed zina and is convicted and punished for that offense. This
criticism is indeed founded in the stark reality of the Pakistani criminal
justice system. There have been many cases where women allege the
commission of zina-bil-jabr against them, but the police, taking into consideration the pregnancy caused by the alleged rape and the delay in
bringing the complaint, treat their case as one of zina instead.48 In a few
of these cases, the Sessions Courts acquitted the accused rapists for lack
of sufficient evidence against them, yet nonetheless convicted the female
victims for the offense of zina, regarding as proof the pregnancy caused
by the alleged rape. The circular argument adopted by the Sessions
Courts in these cases is that extra-marital pregnancy amounts to proof
that an act of sexual intercourse occurred, and since the woman has
failed to prove the rape, through the absence of consent or otherwise, the
sexual intercourse is therefore consensual and amounts to zina.49 Even
47. Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) (Amendment) Act (VI of 1997)
(amending the Zina Ordinance to provide this punishment through the addition of a new
section, § 10(4)).
48. The role of the police in rape cases has been subject to severe criticism. The police in Pakistan are notorious for ill-treatment of rape victims and in many cases refuse to
file charges. Police officials have also been accused of committing rape on women in
their custody. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIME OR CUSTOM?: VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN PAKISTAN 45–47, 52–64 (2001). For recommendations on reform of
police practice and rules, see id. at 10–11.
49. This represents a misunderstanding of the burden of proof in criminal cases. In
order to convict an accused, the prosecution has to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt”
that the accused committed the crime. See, e.g., 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1308 (2006). In
contrast, in order to win a civil case, a party has to prove that it is more likely than not
that its claim is true. See, e.g., 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1311 (2006). Therefore, one might
legitimately say that in order to win a civil case a party has to bring sufficient evidence to
show that the probability of its version of the events being true is more than fifty percent.
On the other hand, it is not possible to assign a numerical value to the burden of proof in
criminal cases. For example, when a trial judge in the United States instructed a jury that
the standard of proof could be viewed as “seven and a half, if you had to put it on a scale”
of ten, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed on appeal stating: “The concept of reasonable
doubt is inherently qualitative. Any attempt to quantify it may impermissibly lower the
prosecution’s burden of proof.” McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983).
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those rape victims who ultimately escape conviction for zina end up suffering significant imprisonment prior to and during trial, and are subjected to unnecessary stigma, humiliation, and pain.50
In most jurisdictions, rape and other sexual crimes are usually exceedingly hard to prove. For example, these crimes are often committed in
private, so invariably the victim’s word is pitted against that of the accused.51 Given that conviction for a crime, especially one as serious as
rape, requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, courts require the prosecution to adduce significant medical or other circumstantial evidence in
corroboration of the victim’s testimony.52 In Pakistan, the possibility of
credible medical evidence being available to a criminal court is minimal.
When a victim alleges rape, the normal practice is to present the victim
for a medical examination at a government hospital. In most cases, the
medical examination reveals only limited evidence: (a) whether sexual
intercourse has recently taken place as indicated by the presence of semen in the vagina; (b) whether the victim has been having sexual intercourse in the past; and (c) whether the victim has become pregnant.53
Medical techniques which may identify the perpetrator, such as DNA
testing of semen or paternity testing, have become widely available to the
police and prosecution in most Western jurisdictions, but still remain
unavailable in Pakistan except in the most high profile cases.54

Nonetheless, should the prosecution fail to secure a conviction because it only managed
to prove that its version of the facts was seventy-five percent probable, it may still be
possible to hold that it is more likely than not that the prosecution is telling the truth. For
example, whereas O.J. Simpson was found not guilty of murder at his criminal trial, he
was, nonetheless, found liable at the subsequent civil trial. See Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 492, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). By the same logic, if a victim brings a charge of
zina-bil-jabr but fails to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, she may still be telling the
truth. As such, there is no reason to assume if she has fails to prove zina-bil-jabr, then she
must have committed zina. Treating zina and zina-bil-jabr as either/or offenses represents
a logical fallacy.
50. See Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 217–29.
51. See Tiffany Bohn, Yes, Then No, Means No: Current Issues, Trends, and Problems in Post-Penetration Rape, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 151, 173–75 (2004) (noting that a
problem of proof in rape cases is conflicting testimony of the victim and the accused).
52. JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 13. But see 75 C.J.S. Rape § 94 (2006)
(“Corroboration of a victim’s testimony in sexual offense cases is triggered only by contradictions in the victim’s trial testimony.”).
53. See Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 235–60 (describing the uses and limits of
medical evidence in Zina Ordinance cases).
54. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 47–49, 64–95 (detailing the lack of
“medicolegal” capabilities and facilities in Pakistan). For recommendations on reform of
Pakistan’s medicolegal system, see id. at 11–14.
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Given Pakistan’s conservative social environment, with its stigma attachments and concerns regarding family honor such that “honor killing”
is even a possibility, victims in most rape cases do not lodge complaints
with the police.55 In cases where a complaint is filed, it is usually after
long and careful deliberation by the family of the accused. In many
cases, the rape is only reported after the victim becomes aware of her
pregnancy and realizes that she has no choice but to complain. In such
situations, the rudimentary medical examinations conducted are not
likely to produce any helpful evidence. In fact, the medical evidence in
most cases makes the victim’s position even more precarious, since it is
assumed that she is making an accusation of rape only to excuse her illicit conduct. Thus, in choosing between reporting and silence, rape victims often find themselves in a lose-lose situation.
III. THE CASES
There have been at least eight reported cases in which the FSC has explicitly dealt with the question of whether pregnancy can be considered
sufficient proof of zina in the absence of any other evidence. A chronological analysis of these cases, revealing the progressive development of
the Court’s views on this narrow issue, as well as the laws pertaining to
zina and zina-bil-jabr generally, is as follows:
A. Sakina v. State (1981)56
Sakina and Wali Dad were married to each other at the time of their arrest for commission of zina. The prosecution, based on the First Information Report (F.I.R.)57 lodged by Sakina’s brother, alleged that Sakina and
Wali Dad had had an illicit relationship prior to their marriage. At the
time of her arrest, Sakina, according to the medical examiner, had been
pregnant for thirty-two weeks even though less than eighteen weeks had
elapsed since her marriage to Wali Dad. Sakina’s explanation for her premarital pregnancy was that it might have been the result of sexual acts
she had been forced to engage in with certain visitors by her family. The
Sessions Court disbelieved her, convicted both she and Wali Dad for zina

55. See Manar Waheed, Note, Domestic Violence in Pakistan: The Tension Between
Intervention & Sovereign Autonomy in Human Rights Law, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937,
944–46 (2004) (describing the practice of honor killing in Pakistan).
56. 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. 320 (1981).
57. The F.I.R. is the formal complaint of an offense lodged with the police. The F.I.R.
is the pivotal document in Pakistani criminal prosecutions. Judges, both trial and appellate, frequently test the veracity of the prosecution’s evidence by comparing it to the version of the events alleged in the F.I.R.
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liable to tazir, and sentenced them each to four years of rigorous imprisonment and thirty-three lashes.58
In a brief judgment, a full bench of the FSC overturned both convictions. As regards Wali Dad, the Court found no credible evidence against
him.59 In Sakina’s case, the Court stated:
In these circumstances we have no material on record to enable us to
hold that Mst. Sakina had been committing sexual intercourse with others willingly. In the absence of proof of her consent she cannot be held
to have committed the offence of Zina.60

As such, the Court affirmed a cardinal principle of criminal law, that
the burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt is on the prosecution.61 Until the prosecution satisfies that burden,
the accused has no case to answer.
A woman’s consent is an essential element for any conviction for the
crime of zina.62 This element has to be categorically proven by the prosecution, and cannot merely be inferred from the accused’s pregnancy or
other surrounding circumstances. Here, the Sessions Court had treated
the question of consent as if the absence of consent is a defense that the
accused has to establish to the court’s satisfaction. This shifted the burden of proof to the accused. The FSC rightly corrected that error.
B. Jehan Mina v. State (1983)63
Jehan Mina was hardly sixteen at the time of her arrest. She was approximately five to six months pregnant, and claimed that her uncle and
cousin had raped her while she was visiting their home to look after a
sick aunt.64 At the time of the discovery of her pregnancy, Jehan Mina
was living with another uncle, Noor Said. Allegedly, Jehan Mina’s
grandfather, her legal guardian, demanded that Noor Said hand Jehan
Mina over to his custody so that he might kill her in order to preserve the
family’s honor. Noor Said refused his family’s pressure, and lodged an
F.I.R. with the police. Instead of initiating an investigation of zina-biljabr, the police made Jehan Mina a co-accused in a case of zina. The Sessions Court trying the case acquitted both of the accused males on the
58. Sakina, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. at 321.
59. Id. at 322.
60. Id. at 323.
61. See supra note 49.
62. See Offence of Zina Ordinance § 4, supra note 1, at 52 (requiring persons to
“willfully have sexual intercourse” for conviction).
63. 35 P.L.D. 1983 F.S.C. 183 (1983).
64. Id. at 184.
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grounds that they could not be convicted merely on the basis of Jehan
Mina’s statement.65 However, the court convicted Jehan Mina for zina
liable to hadd, and imposed a punishment of one hundred lashes.
The FSC upheld Jehan Mina’s conviction on appeal, but reduced her
offense from zina liable to hadd to zina liable to tazir. Taking into consideration her “tender age” and the fact that she had been deprived of the
“benefit of paternal affection,” the Court reduced her sentence to three
years rigorous imprisonment and ten lashes.66 The Court provided the
following rationale in justification of its decision: “[T]he basis of the
conviction is her unexplained pregnancy coupled with the fact that she is
not a married girl.”67 The Court added that since Jehan Mina had kept
quiet for over five months, it was “difficult to believe her statement that
zina-bil-jabr had been committed with her.”68 The Court also found it
important that “she had the opportunity of complaining to her grandfather but . . . never did so.”69
Given that her grandfather had expressed a serious intent to kill her in
order to preserve the family honor, how valid was the Court’s reasoning?
This case has been widely criticized and cited as a representative example of the gross injustices perpetrated under the Hudood laws.70 According to one women’s rights campaigner:
Apart from the injustice that Jehan Mina suffered from society and the
system of justice, the case had serious future implications for victims of
rape resulting in pregnancy. While rapists would have to be proved
guilty, victims would be presumed guilty and the burden would be on
them to prove their innocence.71

The legal reasoning employed by the FSC in this judgment clearly conflicted with that in Sakina. The Court in Jehan Mina appeared to have
forgotten the fundamental principles of criminal liability outlined in its
own precedent. Further, the purpose of the creation of an independent
FSC with three ulema on its bench was to decide cases according to the
Islamic injunctions laid down in the Qu’ran and Sunnah.72 In this case,
the Court based its decision exclusively on misapplied common law
65. Id. at 186.
66. Id. at 188.
67. Id. at 187.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., SHAHLA ZIA, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & THEIR QUEST FOR JUSTICE
81 (2002).
71. Id. But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 40 (“Such cases are far less
frequent in the late 1990s than they were in the 1980s.”).
72. See supra note 8.
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principles of criminal liability and evidence, without even once referring
to Islamic principles of liability.
C. Siani v. State (1984)73
The Siani case arose from the discovery of a stillborn fetus in a residential area. The prosecution alleged that Siani, wife of Pahalwan, had
engaged in unlawful sexual intercourse with her co-accused, Ghulam
Najaf, prior to her marriage, and that this relationship resulted in her
pregnancy. The prosecution further charged that in order to conceal her
zina and the resulting pregnancy, Siani had caused herself to miscarry
and had disposed of the aborted fetus.74 The Sessions Court acquitted her
male co-accused, finding no evidence against him. The only evidence
against Siani was the report of the medical examiner, who had opined
that Siani showed signs of recent pregnancy and had probably miscarried
around the time of the discovery of the dead fetus.75 This was sufficient
proof for the Sessions Court, which convicted Siani of the offense of zina
liable to tazir under Section 10 of the Zina Ordinance and sentenced her
to five years rigorous imprisonment and thirty lashes.
A single bench of the FSC, composed solely of Justice Muhammad
Siddiq, overturned Siani’s conviction on appeal, holding that medical
evidence of pregnancy alone cannot form the basis of a criminal conviction.76 The Court, affirming the stance adopted in Sakina, and without
referring to Jehan Mina, made the following comment:
This Court has already said in several cases that a mere pregnancy/abortion or birth of an illegal child of an unmarried girl/widow
or a married woman whose husband has no access to her during the
relevant period, could not be sufficient to prove her guilty under section
10 of the Ordinance unless it is further proved by the prosecution that
she was a consenting party for the said Zina resulting in her conception
and then in abortion.77

Unlike the accused in Sakina, Siani had not alleged that she had been
subjected to zina-bil-jabr. In fact, she completely denied that she had
ever had sexual intercourse prior to her marriage, or that she had miscarried. In this regard, Siani better illustrates the principle already stated:
that the burden is squarely upon the prosecution to prove all of the elements of the offense, consent of the woman being the most essential.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

36 P.L.D. 1984 F.S.C. 121 (1984).
Id. at 123.
Id. at 123–24.
Id. at 126.
Id.
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The Court in Siani considered the status of medical evidence in the following terms:
In the instant case it is an admitted fact that there is no other direct or
positive evidence produced by the prosecution to substantiate the
charge . . . against Mst. Siani appellant. In addition to the medical evidence the prosecution should have produced some other direct or circumstantial evidence to connect the appellant with the offence
charged.78

This pronouncement makes clear that in order to secure a conviction, the
prosecution has to prove all the elements of the offense through credible
direct or circumstantial evidence, including the fact that the accused
“was a consenting party for the commission of sexual intercourse.”79
Medical evidence of pregnancy, and by logical extension, pregnancy itself, can only provide “a piece of independent corroboration.”80 Thus, the
Court unambiguously declared that pregnancy, by itself, cannot form the
basis for a conviction.81
D. Rafaqat Bibi v. State (1984)82
Rafaqat Bibi filed a complaint of zina-bil-jabr against Muhammad
Suleman. However, when the medical examiner found her to be eight
months pregnant, the police instead charged both of them with zina. The
Sessions Court convicted Rafaqat Bibi for zina liable to tazir, and sentenced her to five years rigorous imprisonment and five lashes. The
court, however, acquitted Suleman.83
A single bench of the FSC overturned the conviction. The Court stated
that though Rafaqat Bibi was in the ninth month of her pregnancy at the
time of the examination:
[T]he aforesaid evidence cannot be considered sufficient to convict the
appellant for commission of offence of zina which has been defined in
section 4 of the Ordinance, and inter alia involves willfully having sexual intercourse. In the instant case according to the appellant there was
no willful participation in the sexual intercourse by her as Muhammad
Suleman committed zina-bil-jabr with her.84

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.L.R. 1984 S.D. 165 (F.S.C. 1984).
Id. at 166.
Id.
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The Court considered relevant the fact that Rafaqat Bibi had filed an
F.I.R. of her own volition, “wherein she had expressly stated that she had
been made to submit forcibly to sexual intercourse.”85 The Court did not
refer to Rafaqat Bibi’s eight-month delay in filing the F.I.R., as if that
fact were immaterial.
The Court also dealt with the extent to which an accused’s statement
may be treated as a partial confession of the fact that sexual intercourse
took place and answered it in the negative. An affirmative answer to this
question forms the first vital limb of the irrational reasoning of the erring
trial courts.86 Citing Safia Bibi v. State with approval,87 the Court said
that the “[c]onfession should be read as a whole and exculpatory portions
therein cannot be excluded from consideration unless there is evidence
on record to prove those portions incorrect.”88
E. Safia Bibi v. State (decided in 1983, reported in 1985)89
This case resulted in widespread notoriety of the Hudood laws in the
national as well as international media.90 Safia Bibi, a twenty-year-old
girl suffering from acute myopia such that she was nearly blind, was engaged in domestic service at the household of Maqsood Ahmad. She alleged that on one occasion, while she was working, Ahmad subjected her
to zina-bil-jabr.91 According to her testimony, Maqsood Ahmad’s father
had also raped her on a different occasion, but he was not charged with
any offense. Succumbing to social and family pressures, Safia Bibi did
not file a complaint with the police until she could no longer hide her
pregnancy. The police arrested Safia Bibi and implicated her in a case of
zina along with Maqsood Ahmad, after her medical examination revealed
that she had been pregnant and had given birth. At the ensuing trial, the
Sessions Court acquitted Maqsood Ahmad, but convicted Safia Bibi of
zina and sentenced her to three years rigorous imprisonment and fifteen
stripes.
On appeal, a single bench of the FSC reversed Safia Bibi’s conviction
for zina. However, the Court affirmed that there was no evidence to convict Maqsood Ahmad of zina-bil-jabr, stating that “[i]t is clear from this
85. Id.
86. See supra text accompanying note 49.
87. Interestingly, the FSC’s decision in Safia Bibi had not yet been reported at this
time. For a treatment of the case, see infra Part II.E.
88. Rafaqat Bibi, N.L.R. 1984 S.D. at 166.
89. 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. 120 (1983).
90. Id. at 121 (“This is an unfortunate case which received considerable publicity in
the national and International Press”).
91. Id. at 122.
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evidence that no offence was proved against Maqsood Ahmad as the bare
statement of his co-accused [Safia Bibi] was not sufficient for his conviction.”92 In its judgment, the Court analyzed the relevant principles of Islamic jurisprudence in some detail and summarized the positions of the
different schools of fiqh:
If an unmarried woman delivering a child pleads that the birth was the
result of commission of the offence of rape on her, she cannot be punished. This is the view of the Hanafis and the Shafis. But Imam Malik
said she shall be subjected to Hadd punishment unless she manifested
the want of consent on her part by raising alarm or by complaining
against it later.93

The Court went on to elaborate:
There is little difference between the view of Imam Malik and others
on the point of law that rape with a woman absolves her of criminal liability. The only difference is on the point of the evidentiary value of
the self-exculpatory statement. Imam Malik places the burden of proving the self-exculpatory evidence on the woman, and this burden can be
discharged by her by proving that she raised alarm or complained
against it. She can discharge her burden by production of circumstantial
evidence . . . .The others, however, consider her statement including the
self-exculpatory portion thereof as sufficient for absolving her of the
charge.94

So, as opposed to the view of Imam Malik, who places the burden of
disproving consent on the woman, the opinion of the Hanafis and the
Shafis is that the woman’s statement is sufficient in itself to absolve her
of all charges. This view is preferable according to the FSC, since it “is
in conformity with the modern law.”95
F. Rani v. State (1996)96
Rani was seven months pregnant when she lodged a complaint of zinabil-jabr against her two male co-accused. She claimed that she had refrained from filing a complaint because of threats made against her and
her family by these men until her pregnancy became impossible to hide.
The Sessions Court acquitted both males because there was no evidence
against them “except the word and accusations” of Rani. The court, however, convicted Rani after taking into account her pregnancy and the de92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125.
35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. 150 (F.S.C. 1996).
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lay in lodging the F.I.R. She was sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment and seven lashes.97
The appeal before the FSC raised all the issues that had arisen in the
previous cases. In an incisive and articulate judgment, Justice Ghous
Muhammad reviewed the Court’s earlier case law on the subject. First,
the Court criticized the decision in Jehan Mina and recommended that it
be “confined to the annals of legal history.” That judgment, the Court
found, was in conflict with established FSC jurisprudence.98 As regards
the issue of pregnancy being considered as proof of guilt, the Court then
concluded:
(i) mere pregnancy is not sufficient to convict a woman for Zina, especially where she claims the pregnancy to have been caused due to her
rape/Zina-bil-jabr by man/men who later stand acquitted on any
ground;
(ii) to convict a woman for Zina, the prosecution would have to discharge the heavy onus of proof by bringing forth positive and independent evidence that the woman actually and in fact had committed
Zina with her own free will and consent with another man to whom she
was not lawfully married to. In this regard it may also be stated that
mere proof of pregnancy or some form of medical testimony/report on
its own could be of no consequence as the latter would at best only
serve to be corroborative in nature . . . .99

Next, on the matter of delay in registering a complaint of zina-bil-jabr,
usually considered a detriment to the victim’s case, the Court opined:
On the contrary, this point would fall in favour of the female accused
i.e. the appellant since she could well forward the plea that the inordinate delay by the prosecution in detecting her pregnancy would entitle
her to an acquittal on the general principle that any delay in lodging the
FIR/complaint weakens the case of the prosecution/complainant.100

Finally, Justice Muhammad stated that:
[B]y its very nature ‘Zina’ is a joint offence requiring positive identification of a man and a woman, distinctly, consenting [to] an unlawful
sexual intercourse . . . In case any one of them fails to be so identified,
as has been in the present case, no offence of ‘Zina’ can be made out by
the prosecution.101

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 151.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id. at 157–58.
Id. at 159.
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Though interesting and persuasive, these arguments are, nonetheless,
only dicta and as such are not binding on the Court in future cases.
G. Zafran Bibi v. State (2002)102
Despite such clear pronouncements of the FSC, history unfortunately
repeated itself in the case of Zafran Bibi. The case brought to the fore,
once again, many of the problems associated with the Hudood laws and
reignited the criticisms.
On March 26, 2001, Zabta Khan, accompanied by his daughter-in-law
Zafran Bibi, went to the police station to lodge an F.I.R. Zabta Khan did
the talking, while Zafran Bibi stood quietly to the side. He claimed that
about two weeks earlier, while Zafran Bibi had gone to a nearby hill to
cut fodder, Akmal Khan had assaulted her and committed zina-bil-jabr
against her. At the time of the incident, Zabta Khan had been away visiting his son, Zafran Bibi’s husband, who was serving a sentence in jail for
murder. Because Zabta Khan was away, Zafran Bibi took the advice of
her mother-in-law to wait for his return before deciding whether to report
to the police.103
Upon his return, and having heard about the incident, Zabta Khan decided to lodge the F.I.R. At least, this is what he claimed. The police directed Zafran Bibi, as well as Zabta Khan, to thumb-mark the F.I.R., and
then sent her for a medical examination. The examination revealed that
she was approximately seven to eight months pregnant.104 Based on the
discrepancy between the alleged date of the incident and the estimated
date of conception, the police arraigned Zafran Bibi as a co-accused
along with Akmal Khan for the offense of zina liable to tazir.
The trial did not begin until a year later. By then, Zafran Bibi had
given birth to a baby girl. In a statement recorded before the Magistrate,
she claimed that Akmal Khan had repeatedly raped her and that she was
willing to take an oath on the Qu’ran that no one except Akmal Khan had
committed zina-bil-jabr with her. As the trial proceeded, Zafran Bibi
changed her stance, contending that, since she was illiterate, she may
have thumb-marked an incorrect account of the incident to the police at
the time of lodging the F.I.R. She then made the following statement on
oath before the trial court:
Zabta Khan is my father-in-law. I was residing in the house of my husband along with his father. One day he took me to the Police Station

102. 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. 1 (2002).
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 9.
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. . . where he lodged the report. I have not given any statement in police
station nor lodged any report to the police . . . . In fact Jamal son of
Zabta Khan has committed Zina forcibly with me and my father-in-law
to save his son Jamal involved accused in the case in hand. Accused
Akmal has not committed Zina with me. He is innocent.105

On April 17, 2002, the Sessions Court announced the verdict. Akmal
Khan was acquitted of the offenses charged for lack of evidence. However, Zafran Bibi was found guilty of the offense of zina liable to hadd,
and the court imposed the punishment of rajm. No action was directed
against Jamal, Zafran Bibi’s brother-in-law, as he had neither been
named in the F.I.R. nor charged with any offense.
Since a hadd punishment cannot be executed unless confirmed by the
FSC,106 Zafran Bibi’s conviction and sentence were appealed. Delivering
the judgment of the Court, Justice Fida Muhammad Khan held:
[M]ere pregnancy, by itself when there is no other evidence at all, of a
married lady, having no access to her husband, or even of an unmarried
girl is no ground for imposition of Hadd punishment if she comes out
with the defence that that was the result of commission of rape with
her.107

On the burden of proving consent, the Court reiterated that “the cardinal principle of Islamic Criminal Law that conviction of someone for
commission of unlawful sexual intercourse, it is not only necessary to
make certain that he/she committed that act, but it is also to be ensured
that he/she committed that of his/her own free-will.”108 Finally, as regards the requirements for confessions to form the basis for a conviction,
the Court emphatically stated:
It is pertinent to mention that the confession to be effective in the context of the Ordinance, firstly must be voluntary, with free consent without any coercion or inducement, secondly must be explicit as to the
commission of the actual offence of Zina with free-will, thirdly must be
four times in four different meetings as held in a number of cases by
Federal Shariat Court and Shariat Appellate Bench and, fourthly, must

105. Id. at 10.
106. See supra text accompanying note 37.
107. Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. at 15.
108. Id. at 17. Nonetheless, despite these forceful pronouncements, the Court managed
to muddy the waters and negate the freshness of approach evidenced in Rani. On the one
hand the Court insisted that the element of consent has to be proven by the prosecution,
while on the other it kept referring to consent as a defense shown by the accused. Id. at
14.
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be recorded by the Court who has competent jurisdiction to try the offence under the law.109

In some measure of consonance with the dicta of Rani, the Court stated
that though delay in lodging a F.I.R. normally weighs negatively against
an accused, that is not a hard and fast rule. In cases of zina, which invariably concern family honor, “mere delay per se is no ground for drawing [an] adverse inference.”110 Accordingly, the Court overturned Zafran
Bibi’s conviction.
H. Gul Hamida v. State (2004)111
Yet another appeal from a conviction where pregnancy was used as
proof of zina reached the FSC in 2004. Gul Hamida had been pregnant
for approximately eight months at the time she lodged the F.I.R. She alleged that her pregnancy was the result of a rape committed by two men.
The Sessions Court convicted her of zina, but acquitted the accused rapists.112 The court inferred Gul Hamida’s guilt from two circumstances: (i)
her pregnancy, and (ii) her failure to disclose the rape for close to eight
months.
The FSC overturned Gul Hamida’s conviction, noting that she had voluntarily lodged the F.I.R. and had adequately explained her delay:
It is a known fact that in our society the girls are ordinarily hesitant to
disclose such an unfortunate incident out of fear or infamy. There is
always a lurking fear in the mind of the victim that she may herself be
held an accused of the sin or the offence. The same apparently has happened in case of the appellant.113

On the issue of the evidentiary value of pregnancy, the FSC held:
In the absence of any positive evidence merely on the basis of pregnancy it cannot be presumed that the victim girl was a willing partner.
To record conviction under the Hudood Ordinance, evidence of an unimpeachable character is required.114

109. Id.
110. Id. at 16.
111. 2005 P.Cr.L.J. 167 (F.S.C. 2004).
112. This was the result of an error by the police and prosecution. They framed the
crime as falling under section 10(2) of the Zina Ordinance, which covers only consensual
extramarital sexual relations. The charge should have been brought under sections 10(3)
or 10(4), which deal with rape and gang rape respectively.
113. Gul Hamida, 2005 P.Cr.L.J. at 171.
114. Id.
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I. Summation
With the exception of Jehan Mina, the FSC cases reviewed have
clearly and consistently laid down the following rules regarding the use
of the evidence of pregnancy in framing charges of zina against a
woman:
1. Consent is a vital element of the offense of zina. It must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt through direct eyewitness testimony, and
medical as well as other circumstantial evidence. Evidence of an unexplained pregnancy, in and of itself, is not conclusive proof of consent.115
2. When a woman alleges rape, she cannot be implicated in a case of
zina. If a woman is charged with zina on account of her pregnancy and,
in her defense, she alleges that she had been raped, then she must be acquitted regardless of whether or not she complained at the time of the
rape. Any delay in lodging an F.I.R., or even an outright failure to do so,
is irrelevant when rape is alleged.116
IV. THE CONTROVERSIES
The jurisprudence of the Federal Shariat Court analyzed in this paper
provides valuable insight into the nature of the debate between the proponents and the opponents of the Hudood laws. The following are some
of the main arguments and counterarguments advanced by both sides:
A. The Standard Critique
The opponents of the Hudood laws have argued all along that the Zina
Ordinance is blatantly discriminatory on its face as well as in its consequences.117 For instance, they argue that the Zina Ordinance discrimi115. This rule might only be applicable in cases where a female is accused of zina. In a
recent case, the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court considered a woman’s
pregnancy as evidence against a male accused. Muhammad Sharif v. State, 2006
S.C.M.R. 1170 (2005). Charges of enticing and zina were brought against the defendant
after his sister-in-law died while undergoing an abortion. Id. at 1171. The defendant’s
conviction was upheld based upon evidence that the deceased had resided with him prior
to her death, presumably to hide her pregnancy. Id. at 1173.
116. This is in conformity with Hanafi and Shafi fiqh. See supra text accompanying
notes 93–95.
117. See, e.g., NCSW Report, supra note 20, at 14; Quraishi, supra note 45, at 309.
However, Charles Kennedy points out that the overwhelming number―eighty-two percent―of defendants in Hudood cases are men, and that “84% of those convicted in district and sessions courts . . . and 90% of those whose convictions are upheld by the FSC
are men.” Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 312. Even as regards
cases of zina, a facially gender-neutral offense, the study found that “56% of those convicted of this crime by district and sessions courts, and 70% of those convicted by the
FSC were men.” Id. Therefore, Kennedy argues, “[o]ne may have legitimate quarrels
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nates against women through its evidentiary rules requiring four Muslim
male witnesses to impose hadd punishment in zina-bil-jabr cases.118
Since it is highly unlikely that a rape will be committed in the presence
of, or be passively witnessed by, four men of a good character, it is almost inconceivable how a hadd conviction for zina-bil-jabr could ever
materialize. Furthermore, if a rape is witnessed by four women instead of
four men, hadd punishment cannot be awarded. As a result, this requirement deters rape victims from complaining, and indirectly encourages
the incidence of rape.
An even more serious consequence of the promulgation of the Zina
Ordinance has been the equation of rape with zina. This equation is not
merely nominal, but substantive and substantial in that the Ordinance is
regularly misused to convert complaints of zina-bil-jabr, or rape, into
those of zina when the accuser fails to bring sufficient evidence to prove
rape.119 This is invariably the case in a criminal justice system characterwith the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, but gender bias against women is not
one of them.” Id. at 313. For an explicit rebuttal of Kennedy’s argument, see JAHANGIR
& JILANI, supra note 2, at 137–38. They contend that the figures are misleading since a
number of cases are converted from rape to zina. Id. However, it is difficult to understand
how this makes any difference, since both offenses are prosecuted under the Ordinance.
If their point is meant to suggest that more men are convicted under the Ordinance because more men are charged with rape, then it becomes easier to understand the argument. This though would then suggest that at least some men who are guilty of rape, if
not all, are charged with zina-bil-jabr and convicted of that offense, and that number far
exceeds the number of women prosecuted for and convicted of zina. See Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 312–13.
118. As Salman Akram Raja has noted, this is not a fully informed argument:
The popular perception of the Zina Ordinance, largely based on the image carried in the press, is that a raped woman must produce four male witnesses
against the accused for a conviction. The legal position that a conviction leading to a tazir punishment can be maintained on the basis of other evidence, including that of the woman herself, is generally absent in the popular understanding of the Zina Ordinance.
Salman Akram Raja, Islamisation of Laws in Pakistan, 2 S. ASIAN J. 94 (2003), available
at http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/Journal/islamisation_laws.htm.
119. It has been recommended that until the Zina Ordinance is repealed, the offenses of
zina and zina-bil-jabr should be separated out into separate sections of the statute. This is
recommended because:
The police frequently register rape complaints simply under Section 10 of the
Zina Ordinance, without specifying the applicable subsection. The ensuing ambiguity as to the type of crime in question not only mars the police investigation
but also leads to additional trauma for the rape victim because of the potential
created for a wrongful prosecution for adultery.
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ized by inadequate investigative and evidentiary mechanisms. The victim’s situation is made worse should she become pregnant, in which case
many trial courts are quick to assume that she is only alleging rape to
cover up the illegitimate pregnancy. Thus, women, who are already relegated to a lesser status in various social, political, and economic settings
in Pakistan, are unable and justifiably unwilling to complain when their
physical sanctity is violated.
The Zina Ordinance has also provided disgruntled parents, brothers,
and former spouses with an opportunity to malign young women in order
to deter them from rebelling against the predominantly patriarchal family
structures by asserting the rights of free choice in marriage and divorce,
or sometimes even the right to live a financially independent life.120 A
majority of zina cases, it is argued, are malicious prosecutions that have
the net effect of reinforcing the socio-economic subservience of women
to the entrenched patriarchal norms.121 These facets of the Hudood laws
and their implementation support the discriminatory milieu of Pakistani
society. So, even if such cases ultimately end in acquittal, the women
who are subjected to the humiliations of trial have already suffered irreparable injustice.
B. A Staunch Defense
The above criticism is usually answered with the assertion that hadd
punishments are fixed maximum punishments that are to be administered
in the clearest of cases only: when the accused has freely confessed or
evidence is available which proves the crime beyond all doubt.122 Since
such proof is not usually forthcoming, hadd punishments act as a deterrent only, serving the vital function of laying down fundamental moral
principles. In fact, there have been no cases in Pakistan in which hadd
punishments have been executed for either zina or zina-bil-jabr.123 The
majority of cases under the Hudood laws are cases of tazir offenses,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 8.
120. See Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 316 (“Added to the normal social control mechanisms available to them, parents, husbands, and guardians have
been empowered by the introduction of the Hudood Ordinances with the real or implicit
threat of bringing criminal charges against their children or wives.”).
121. See Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 217–29.
122. For example, Chief Justice Fazal Ilahi Khan, in Zafran Bibi, stated that “it is
much better that an Imam (i.e. Judge) should err in acquitting someone rather than he
should err in punishing someone (who is not guilty).” Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C.
at 17.
123. See, e.g., JAHANGIR & JILANI, supra note 2, at 47. Though acknowledging that a
hadd punishment has never been executed, Jahangir and Jilani nevertheless argue that its
existence and potential for misuse require its abolition. Id.
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where convictions are based on the same evidentiary standards that are
applicable in normal criminal trials.
It is also argued that though miscarriages of justice do occur during the
trial stage of some Hudood laws cases, just as miscarriages occur in trials
for all offenses in Pakistan’s defective criminal justice system, those errors are corrected by the appellate courts in all but a few cases.124 Thus,
the Hudood laws’ supporters argue that there are no problems inherent in
the substantive rules laid down by the Zina Ordinance, as the injustices
and controversies result from their misapplication. Such sentiments were
expressed by the FSC in Zafran Bibi:
On account of disinformation, misunderstanding, lack of knowledge of
the facts and circumstances of the case, some organizations resorted
even to take out processions and demand repeal of the Hudood Laws itself without realizing that it was not the laws of Hudood (i.e. fixed sentence prescribed by Holy Qur’an and Sunnah) but its misapplication
that resulted in miscarriage of justice . . . . Like other laws, the prosecuting or other components of law-enforcing machinery may err in its
application in respect to various facts and circumstances, however, the
ideal nature of these laws . . . is admittedly far-superior to the manmade laws on account of its highly balanced approach to individual and
public interest.125

Therefore, in defense of the Hudood laws, their proponents ultimately
argue that the laws themselves are not problematic. Rather, it is their
misapplication and misuse by the police and trial courts that results in the
miscarriage of justice.126
C. Resolution of the Political Impasse
It is precisely at this juncture that the debate has come to an impasse;
both sides believe that they have a sufficient basis for their respective
positions, and a satisfactory resolution appears to be presently out of

124. As Charles Kennedy points out, “[b]ecause the percentage of acquittals on appeal
is so high it is doubly important to note the speed with which cases are disposed by the
courts.” Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 311. Kennedy’s study
found that the average time taken by the FSC in disposing of cases was reduced from
eleven months in 1981 to four months in 1987. The sessions courts, on the other hand,
lagged behind, taking an average of eighteen months to decide cases after the F.I.R. was
filed. Id.
125. Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. at 12.
126. See Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 311–15 (describing how
the problems affiliated with the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances are precisely
those which plague the entire criminal justice system in Pakistan).
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reach. Further, the controversies have become politicized to such an extent that it is impossible for either side to retrench.
The opposition to the Hudood laws has thus far focused on campaigning for an outright repeal of these laws.127 This approach is unlikely to
succeed so long as the vast majority of Pakistani citizens continue to believe that the Hudood laws correctly reflect the shari’ah, a conviction
based on the fact that the Qu’ran expressly proscribes zina and assigns
punishment for it.128 However, few are cognizant of the reality that the
Hudood laws misrepresent the shari’ah in certain vital respects, and that
there are glaring defects in the legislation, such as the provision for punishment of zina as tazir.
In such a situation, it is not only unfair to decry the shari’ah for the
failings of the Hudood laws, which are only a cheap imitation, but it is
also impractical to argue for their outright repeal. The only viable option
is to advocate for such amendments to the Hudood laws that would obviate the injustices perpetrated in the name of the shari’ah. However, such
amendments are not likely to be made until a convincing critique is generated, which questions the Hudood laws’ doctrinal foundations and
highlights the discrepancies between the shari’ah doctrines and its counterfeit version presently in force. The possibility of such an “Islamic”
critique has already been demonstrated.129
Such a possibility can be seen in the jurisprudence of the FSC, which
implicitly demonstrates the strength of such a critique. Consider again
Zafran Bibi, where the Court, prior to reaffirming the principle that pregnancy by itself may not be used to prove the commission of zina, appeared to suggest the existence of some circumstances in which pregnancy will become sufficient corroborating evidence:
There is nothing on record to even presume that she was a woman of
easy virtue. There is also no iota of evidence to show even that she was
having any illicit liaison with any male person. The available record is
also completely silent about her having been seen in the company of
any accused, nominated by her in her statements.130

Likewise, in Gul Hamida, the FSC noted that conviction for zina may
be based on circumstantial evidence, presumably including evidence of
pregnancy:

127. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 7; see also supra note 20.
128. See Qur’an 4:15 and 24:2.
129. See Quraishi, supra note 45, at 313 (arguing that the Quranic requirements for the
punishment of zina do not leave room for it to be tried as a tazir offense).
130. Zafran Bibi, 54 P.L.D. 2002 F.S.C. at 14.
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No doubt conviction can be based on the strength of circumstantial evidence but the circumstances should be of such a nature which are unexceptionable and which lead to no other inference or hypothesis except
the guilt of the accused and commission of the offence.131

This language is reminiscent to that found in Safia Bibi, where the
Court stated that consent could not be established “in the absence of any
evidence . . . that [Safia Bibi] and Maqsood Ahmad had any sentimental
attachment for and were on intimate terms with one another.”132 Likewise, in Rafaqat Bibi, the Court held that “in absence of any evidence to
establish sentimental attachment for co-accused it could not be said that
sexual intercourse was indulged into willfully.”133
However, refer to the FSC’s mechanically precise statement of the
elements of the offense of zina in Rani:
i. there should be a man and a woman;
ii. such man and a woman are not validly married to each other;
iii. such man and woman should have committed sexual intercourse
with each other;
iv. such man and woman should have committed sexual intercourse
willfully;
v. there ought to be a penetration.134

Important here is that consent has to coincide with the act of sexual intercourse, or penetration. Even if the accused is reputed to be a woman of
“easy virtue,” the prosecution still has to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that at the time of the alleged incident she willfully had had sexual
intercourse. The same holds true if a woman had had a prior “illicit liaison” with her male co-accused, or if there was sentimental attachment.
More than talking, holding hands, kissing, touching, or even fondling is
required to secure a conviction. Also note that in Sakina there was credible evidence that prior to elopement the accused had had an intimate relationship characterized by “sentimental involvement.”135 Similarly, in
Rani there were allegations that the accused was reputed to be a woman
of “easy virtue.”136 In fact, the defense in Rani was that the accused’s
family had forced her into prostitution. Yet, in neither case was the extra131. Gul Hamida, 2005 P.Cr.L.J. at 171.
132. Safia Bibi, 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. at 123.
133. Rafaqat Bibi, N.L.R. 1984 S.D. at 167.
134. Rani, 35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. at 156 (citing Sukhan v. State, 1985 P.Cr.L.J. 110,
118–19 (F.S.C. 1984)).
135. Sakina, 33 P.L.D. 1981 F.S.C. at 321.
136. Rani, 35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. at 152.

2006]

HUDOOD LAWS

155

marital pregnancy corroborated by such other evidence found sufficient
to secure a conviction for zina.
If the above analysis is correct, in what circumstances may an accused
be convicted for an offense of zina liable to tazir? Apparently, the only
circumstances where a conviction can properly be secured is when there
are eyewitnesses, but numbering less than four, or, hypothetically, when
there is other conclusive evidence such as a video-recording. If there are
less than four witnesses, initiating a prosecution for zina is tantamount to
qazf (unwarranted accusation of zina) under recognized shari’ah principles.137
In Muhammad Masood v. Abdullah,138 Justice Maulana Muhammad
Taqi Usmani, an alim (religious scholar) member, delivered the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court holding that
someone who bears false witness in a case of zina will not be guilty of
qazf until the Court formally declares that such a witness has lied.139
However, the complainant in a case of zina will only avoid liability under the Qazf Ordinance if he or she can bring four eyewitnesses. In the
absence of four eyewitnesses, the complainant will automatically be
deemed guilty of qazf whether or not a court declares that he or she has
lied. Further, the Court expressly overruled an earlier FSC decision
which had held that a complainant of zina who fails to produce four
eyewitnesses may only be liable for qazf if the accusation of zina had
been made in bad faith.140
It is very difficult to reconcile Muhammad Masood with Section 10 of
the Zina Ordinance. When a case of zina is prosecuted in the absence of
four eyewitnesses, which is practically all zina cases since most are tazir
cases, will the court convict the accused for zina while simultaneously
convicting the complainant of qazf? Following this line of reasoning, it is
extremely difficult to conceive of many circumstances in which a prosecution for zina liable to tazir may be initiated. Unfortunately, however,
this contradiction in the FSC’s jurisprudence has not been pressed upon
the Shariat courts or the Pakistani legislature.

137. The law of qazf is derived from verse 24:4 of the Qur’an. See supra note 45. In
practice, zina prosecutions have overwhelmingly outnumbered qazf cases. See CIW Report, supra note 20, at 70 (documenting that only forty-three qazf cases were filed in the
FSC between 1980 and 1987, as compared to 3,399 zina cases).
138. 1992 S.C.M.R. 638 (1992).
139. Id.
140. Id. (overruling Muhammad Bashir v. State, 37 P.L.D. 1985 F.S.C. 384, 394
(1985)).
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D. Reformation of the Hudood laws
Reform, pursuant to an Islamic critique, rather than repeal, represents
the only hope for resolving the intractable argumentation over the Hudood laws. Preferably, such reform should be implemented through appropriate amendments to the Hudood Ordinances. However, until such
amendments become politically feasible, it is advisable to press for the
reformation of Hudood laws before the Shariat courts. After all, the
Shariat courts have the power to review legislation for compatibility with
shari’ah principles.
At the least, the Shariat courts should be asked to harmonize their own
jurisprudence so that their precedents may be widely known, followed
where applicable, or critiqued if they represent a perversion of Islamic
injunctions. Until now, the FSC has failed to regularly refer to its own
previous judgments, or rationalize them. For example, in the cases reviewed, only Rani discussed prior FSC precedent.141 In Zafran Bibi, the
Court failed to refer to any of its own precedents, including Safia Bibi,
which followed a similar reasoning. A harmonization of the law will enable lawyers to cite the appropriate cases before the trial courts, ensuring
that errors of law are reduced. In order to achieve this, academics, human
rights activists, and women’s rights campaigners should give greater attention to researching and analyzing the jurisprudence of the Shariat
courts in Pakistan.142 This will enable them to disseminate relevant and
141. See Rani, 35 K.L.R. 1996 Sh.C. at 151–59 (using the holdings of Sakina, Safia
Bibi, and Siani to disagree with the holding of Jehan Mina).
142. The critics of the Hudood laws have thus far focused primarily on those decisions
of the Sessions courts embodying miscarriages of justice and case studies of police brutality. Further, the critics have shown such a distrust of the FSC that they have failed to
carefully analyze its decisions. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. As Julie Dror
Chadbourne notes, this approach is not only incomplete, but it is also fundamentally unhelpful:
Despite the social, legal and political impact of the Zina Ordinance in Pakistan,
there is still little or no analysis of the substantive law relating to the Offence of
Zina. . . . Instead, Pakistani practitioners as well as the Western media have focused their energies on publicizing a few “shocking” cases and on expressing
their beliefs that the Ordinance is wrong and must be repealed. While it is true
that there are problems with the Ordinance and that it has the capacity to support a social system which is highly biased against women, it is crucial that activists stop the debate on these points long enough to understand how the Ordinance actually affects the lives of women and girls in Pakistan. Until they do,
they will remain denuded in their advocacy efforts because they will see neither
the true impact the Zina Ordinance has on people living in Pakistan nor will
they see that in the eye of the storm the judiciary is their greatest ally in ameliorating the practical impact of the Zina Ordinance.
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correct information to all concerned parties, including the public. Such
efforts will also facilitate more effective representation of the innocent
victims.
The second range of options that ought to be pursued is to advocate the
adoption of enhanced procedural safeguards. For instance, Parliament
passed the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004,143 which mandates
that only a senior police officer of the rank of superintendent may conduct an investigation in a case of zina, and an arrest may be made only
with the permission of the court.144 These provisions do not apply to
cases of zina-bil-jabr. Other procedural safeguards may include the appointment of specialist and more qualified judges for Hudood trials in the
Sessions Courts. Alternatively, the FSC may be decreed the trial court in
Hudood laws cases. The FSC is arguably more competent to try such
cases, and has demonstrated a much more refined approach towards the
enforcement of Hudood laws than the Sessions Courts. Further, it may be
made mandatory for adequate medical tests to be performed in cases of
zina before any prosecutions are initiated. Though this would require
significant expenditure for the necessary facilities and infrastructure, the
development of adequate forensic investigation mechanisms is a pressing
need and such an effort is feasible as well as easily justified.145

Chadbourne, supra note 24, at 180.
143. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2004 (Act I of 2005), reprinted in 57 P.L.D.
2005 Federal Statutes 77 (2005).
144. Section 13 of the Act, which amends Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, reads:
13. Amendment in Chapter XIV, Act V of 1898. ―In the Code, of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), hereinafter referred to as the Code, after section 156, the following new sections shall be inserted, namely:—
....
156B. Investigation against a woman accused of the offence of Zina. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, where a person is accused of offence
of Zina under Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 (VII
of 1979), no police officer below the rank of a Superintendent of Police shall
investigate such offence nor shall such accused be arrested without permission
of the Court.
Explanation. —In this section ‘Zina’ does not include ‘Zina-bil-Jabr’.
Id. at 79–80.
145. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 10–16 (suggesting recommended reforms for police practice and the medicolegal system).
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to expand the debate concerning the Hudood
laws and their enforcement in Pakistan. It has done so through examination of the FSC’s precedents on the controversial issue of pregnancy as
proof of zina. Admittedly, sufficient evidence has not been adduced to
conclusively prove that the Shariat courts have developed an approach
that has rebutted the criticisms of the skeptics.146 In fact, it has not even
been argued that the Shariat courts are capable, by themselves, of resolving all the difficulties. This is because many of the current problems are
rooted in the investigative, prosecutorial, and procedural deficiencies of
Pakistan’s criminal justice system, and are therefore beyond remediation
through reform of substantive laws.
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the debate concerning the Hudood
laws in Pakistan has been both misleading and unproductive, because not
all of the relevant aspects and nuances of the issues have been explored.
First, the role of the Shariat courts in shaping the law through the implementation of coherent and just Islamic doctrines of criminal liability has
been overlooked. Second, the possibility of obviating some of the procedural defects in the criminal justice system, not only in the context of the
Hudood laws but also other “secular” criminal laws, has also been underestimated. If a more nuanced perspective on the Hudood laws is
adopted―incorporating the possibility of substantive reform in accordance with an Islamic critique implemented preferably through statutory
amendments, coherent case law, enhanced procedural safeguards, and a
general reform of the criminal justice system―this may lead to a resolution of these controversies. The alternative is a continuation of an ideological struggle in which the politicos win but the victims lose out.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
As of the date of publication, the processes of reform advocated in this
paper have begun to materialize. For the first time since the enactment of
the Hudood Ordinances, mainstream news media organizations in Pakistan have started a dialogue on the laws and their the conformity to Islamic injunctions.147 Additionally, on November 15, 2006, the “Protec-

146. But see Kennedy, Islamization in Pakistan, supra note 24, at 309–11 (arguing that
the statistical data on the disposition of Hudood Ordinances appeals shows that the FSC
has played a significant role in moderating the zealousness and remedying the incompetence of sessions court judges).
147. This public debate began when Geo Television, a leading Urdu-language Pakistani television network, launched a series of programs entitled Zara Sochieye. Zara Sochieye, http://www.geo.tv/zs. In these programs, notable religious scholars, lawyers, for-
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tion of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Bill”148 was passed by the
National Assembly after receiving support from both the government and
several opposition parties.149 The bill proposes several major changes to
the Zina Ordinance:
1. Abolition of the offense of zina-bil-jabr liable to hadd;
2. Abolition of the offense of zina-bil-jabr liable to tazir and reinstatement of the pre-Hudood rape provisions in the Pakistan Penal Code, including the removal of the marital rape exemption;
3. Abolition of the offense of zina liable to tazir;
4. Introduction of the offense of public lewdness in the Pakistan
Penal Code;
5. Abolition of the penalty of rajm for zina liable to hadd;
6. Abolition of the mandatory death sentence for the offense of
gang rape, and replacing in its stead a discretionary sentence of
either death or life imprisonment;
7. Criminalization of the publication of a case of zina or rape;
8. Zina shall be cognizable only by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the presentation of four witnesses; and
9. Qazf proceedings may automatically be instituted by a court
where a complaint of zina has been made but four witnesses are
not presented.
The bill has been passed amidst steadfast claims by the government
that the proposed amendments conform to Islamic injunctions.150 As
noted in the bill’s statement of objects and reasons: “The primary object
of all these amendments is to make zina and qazf punishable only in accordance with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an
and Sunnah, to prevent exploitation, curb abuse of police powers and

mer judges, and other intellectuals questioned whether the Hudood Ordinances completely conform to the injunctions of the Qu’ran and Sunnah.
148. A copy of the bill, as originally presented in the National Assembly, is available
at http://www.dawn.com/2006/08/24/nat3.htm. The version passed by the National Assembly, however, includes certain amendments to the original version.
149. Ifran Ghauri, NA Passes Women’s Protection Bill, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Nov. 16,
2006, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C11%5C16
%5Cstory_16-11-2006_pg1_3. Before the bill becomes law, it must now be approved by
the Pakistani Senate.
150. See, e.g., Prove It Un-Islamic and I’ll Resign: Shujaat, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Nov.
16, 2006, available at http://216.122.144.99/default.asp?page=2006\11\16\story_16-112006_pg1_5.
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create a just and egalitarian society.”151 Opponents of the bill from the
religious right, however, have criticized it as being “un-Islamic.”152
Some civil society and human rights organizations have also been vocal in their criticism of the bill. They believe the bill does not go far
enough, and insist that the Hudood Ordinances be repealed outright.153
Nevertheless, most Pakistani commentators perceive the bill as being a
step in the right direction.

151. Raja Asghar, Pakistan: Opposition Up in Arms over Women’s Rights Bill,
MUSLIM NEWS (U.K.), Aug. 22, 2006, available at http://www.muslimnews.co.uk
/news/news.php?article=11594.
152. Id.
153. WPB: A Step Forward or a Step in the Wrong Direction, DAILY NEWS (Pak.),
Nov. 16, 2006, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\11\16\
story_16-11-2006_pg7_18.

